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This paper was structured with four principal questions in mind: (1) What are
the symptoms of macroeconomic problems in an oil-rich economy? (2) To
what extent can these symptoms be detected now in the Mexican economy?
(3) Have decision-makers anticipated the problem, and have steps been taken
to moderate any undesirable side effects of oil? (4) What are Mexico's eco-
nomic prospects during the 1980s under the impact of oil? The four sections of
this paper try to provide answers to these questions.
THE OIL SYNDROME
OPEC countries, especially the Persian Gulf members, do not seem to fit
well within the standard development taxonomy. According to the basic LDG
and MDC classification, LDC economies can be recognized by the following
characteristics:
(1) Low productivity generally, and undiversified supply, originating in lack
of capital and overall low savings rate; (2) Surplus labor, low labor productiv-
ity, and large pockets of unemployment and underemployment; (3) Presence of
sectoral imbalances, and dualities in production and distribution; (4) Chronic
deficits in the external balance, requiring large foreign borrowing; and (5)
Chronically high inflation.
MDC economies, in contrast, are defined by the absence of the first three of
these features, and relatively milder problems of external imbalance and in-
flation. The oil-rich countries appear as hybrids. By their inflation and their
sectoral imbalances, they qualify as LDCs. However, their external surpluses,
abundance of financial capital, high savings rate, and labor shortages place
them in the MDC category. They are in fact economies in transition, having
been catapulted in 1973-74 from one category toward the other. Their eco-116 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
PRIMARY OIL INDICATORS: OPEC MEMBERS IN 1978
Proven crude oil Crude oil production Share of crude In Share of petroleum
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aData for 1977.
bData for 1976.
nomic, political, and social opportunities, and problems seem to stem from
this fact.
1
In trying to define the "oil syndrome," the smallest and richest members of
OPEC provide ideal "clinical cases." In particular, four of the Persian Gulf
states, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, permit the
observation of the effects of massive oil wealth in its extreme form. Table 1
contains four basic oil ratios for all the OPEC members in 1978. The indicators
are proven reserves and crude output (both in per capita terms), the crude oil
share in merchandise exports, and the crude and gas share in GDP. I de-
nominate them primarily oil indicators.
These Persian Gulf countries provide one polar basis for examining the oil
symptoms. Indonesia and Ecuador, on the other hand, with smaller production
relative to population, could provide the basis for defining a milder variety of
the "oil syndrome."
In any case, indicators of heavy oil dependence in the range of Table 1 (or
movement towards them) can be taken as a prima facie evidence of the "oil
syndrome." They, along with a few others, can be called direct or primary
symptoms, to distinguish them from the secondary or policy-induced effects.
From the experience of 1973-78 of the countries selected, other primary
symptoms (of the polar variety) are the following: (1) Expanding surpluses
in the external accounts; (2) Rapid but unbalanced growth lead by the oilMEXICAN OIL SYNDROME 117
sector accompanied by development of severe bottlenecks; and (3) Accelerated
inflation, generated by excess demand and liquidity in the presence of deficient
supply.
The four Persian Gulf countries exhibit these primary symptoms in their
most extreme form. However, I have selected, for the sake of brevity, the case of
Saudi Arabia to provide the statistical illustration of these traits. Table 2 con-
tains indicators of growth, balance of trade, inflation, and a few other supporting
time-series for 1970-77 for this country (averages for 1965-69 are provided
also). In analyzing the Saudi data, or that of any other petroleum exporter, it
should be remembered that oil export prices began their climb in 1971, when
OPEC's aim of restoring real oil prices to their mid-1950 levels finally began to
bear fruit. The price explosion of October 1973 occurred on a trend that began
two years earlier. Notice also that Saudi Arabia's syndrome originates not only
from price increases; volume has also expanded, although at a slower pace.
2
Confronted with massive oil wealth, the governments of the oil nations have
reacted with similar policies. Among them, the following are typical: (1) Efforts
to diversify, with stress on rapid capital formation in the industrial sector and
promotion of the financial system; (2) Enlargement of the role of the govern-
ment, mainly via infrastructure investment and expanded welfare and subsidy
systems; (3) Opening of the borders to imports of goods and factors, including
much needed skilled labor; and (4) Efforts to control inflation, partly through
the redirection of part of the petrodollars toward foreign assets; another, a stop-
and-go growth policy, accompanied by exchange rate revaluation vis-a-vis the
dollar.
These responses, which we classify as secondary symptoms, are interrelated.
3
In trying to diversify the economy, the government has sought to enlarge and
Table 2
SAUDI ARABIA MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATOR, 1970-77
Averages
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
9.4 14.2 15.4 19.7 15.1 2.3 8.6 17.0 5.6
0.2 4.4 4.4 16.6 21.4 34.6 31.6 11.3 -1.6
1.260 2.640 3.053 5.428 26.379 21.152 25.070 25.730 -
3.44 10.23 42.5 39.9 41.4 89.6 71.2 58.3 28.1
0.543 1.327 2.383 3.747 14.153 23.193 26.900 29.903 19.200
1.30 1.65 1.90 2.70 9.76 10.72 11.51 12.42 12.42
3.79 4.76 6.01 7.59 8.47 7.07 8.57 9.20
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1979, Vol. 32 (Washington, IMF), p. 359; Crude oil out-
put: Annual Report 1978, Kingdom of Saudia Arabia, Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, p. 140.
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modernize the infrastructure. Imports, foreign skills, and technology are re-
quired for this purpose. The opening of the economy is also intended to
ameliorate some of the bottlenecks and the resulting inflationary pressures.
Subsidies and transfers (or tax cuts) have been established for distributive pur-
poses and to shield the population from inflation.
The initial export expansion, plus the combination of the policies just
cited, has led to significant changes in the composition of GDP. Diversification,
sought both via incentives to the private sector, plus the rapid enlargement of
the infrastructure, has resulted in large increases in capital formation. The
opening of the economy has increased the import share. Public consumption has
also expanded, owing to the larger role taken by the government as both em-
ployer and consumer. The main balancing change has been the decrease in the
share of private consumption. Table 3 shows these compositional changes for
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Venezuela in 1970-77.
The symptoms described, observable in their extreme form in the small
Persian Gulf countries, are found in somewhat milder forms in the larger oil
exporters, where reserves and production per capita are much lower. There,
the initial expansion of external surpluses gave rise to a contraction or stabiliza-
tion of the external deficit. However, the policy-induced opening of the
economy and the fast growth can lead, in a later phase, to expanding deficits,
as was the case of Venezuela in 1978. Similarly, the secondary symptom of
financial capital outflows can become one of reduced rate of foreign borrowing.
The exchange rate policy can be one of stabilization, instead of revaluation.
The expanding role of the government can be less marked, if the economy is
less centralized and more oriented to the private sector. The rate of inflation
can accelerate more rapidly, if protectionism is well entrenched, so that opening
up of the economy can proceed only haltingly.
It should be noted that the manifestations of some of these general symptoms
are often marked, and specific to certain economic sections. Thus, for example,
the problem of sectoral imbalances tends to appear early in the form of trans-
port, port, and communications congestion. Construction and real estate booms
are another typical result. If price controls are employed to cope with inflation,
then shortages occur, together with widespread speculation and black markets.
The increased role of the public sector has ramifications in the form of rapid
proliferation of governmental agencies and concomitant growth in number
of government employees. Diversification tends to appear sooner in the financial
sector, due to the relative ease, vis-a-vis that of the real sector, at which it can
expand. Nonfinancial diversification is then pursued, as can be expected, in
oil refining, its overseas transport, and in photochemicals. Following the pre-
vious nomenclature, these can be called derived symptoms.
Efforts to stabilize the exchange rate in the face of high domestic inflation are
typical responses of oil exporters. The ensuing overvaluation of the local cur-MEXICAN OIL SYNDROME 119
Table 3
SECONDARY OIL INDICATORS: CHANGES IN GDP COMPOSITION FOR



























































































Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1979, Vol.
32, (Washington, IMF).
rency eventually leads to stagnation of nonoil exports and the import-substitut-
ing industries. A dramatic devaluation usually marks the end of the overvalua-
tion period. In the literature the effects of this policy, in their extreme form,
are known as the "Kuwait Effect," or, in their milder form, the "Dutch Dis-
ease." See [2, p. 8].
THE EARLY OIL SYMPTOMS IN MEXICO, 1978-79
The early signs of the oil syndrome in Mexico can be detected in 1978
and more clearly in 1979. Their presence can be ascertained in the movements
of the petroleum indicators and especially by comparing the actual and the







OIL INDICATORS: MEXICO', 1974, 1978-79
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Source: DIEMEX Data Bank, Based on Banco de Mexico Reports.
oil boom that began only in 1978 and 1979, and since Mexico is already a
large and semiindustrialized economy, the primary and some secondary symp-
toms have so far taken milder forms than in the Persian Gulf countries.
The indicators for those years and for 1974 are shown in Table 4. Although
these ratios are well below those of the richer Persian Gulf countries (Table 1),
their increase has been substantial in recent years, especially in the oil export
share. Moreover, in the oil wealth per capita Mexico outranked several OPEC
members in 1978. The relative smallness of the three other lower ratios can
be explained by Mexican population (67 million in 1978) and its already ad-
vanced output and export product diversification.
The presence of the other primary symptoms, though faint in some cases,
can be clearly detected. The most obvious is the external balance effect. Without
crude oil exports, the contractions of the deficit in current account below the
US $3.0 billion mark of 1976 could not have occurred. This is evident from
Table 5 which presents Mexico's main macro indicators for 1971-79. The wide
liberalization of imports of 1978-79 could not have occurred either and the
deficit would have doubled in 1979 in the absence of oil.
The unbalanced growth and inflation symptoms can be detected by con-
trasting the economic plan of President Lopez Portillo for 1977-79, the first
half of his term, with the actual behavior of the economy. When the new
government assumed office in 1977, inflation was abnormally high. The funda-
mental aim of the government's plan was to bring inflation down to the ex-
ternal inflation rate by the end of 1979.* Accordingly, the six-year policy of the
new government was divided into three periods: the deflationary phase (1977—
78), the consolidation phase (1979-80), and the expansionary phase (1981—
82). The whole purpose behind this plan was, first, the elimination of the in-
flationary gap and, second, the moderation of growth to ensure that the gap
did not widen again before the economy could utilize the new oil resources, in
1981-82, to fuel faster growth. The basic element in the strategy was that of
restraining the oil boom until inflation was completely eradicated or back
under control.
Lopez Portillo's program was formulated with an important geo-economic
fact in mind. Mexico, in contrast with Argentina, Brazil, or Chile, cannot af-
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with the US makes Mexico a semiopen economy. Customs and controls are
relatively easy to evade, especially in border towns which now form a part
(the poor one) of one single larger urban unit with the US counterpart
(Ciudad Juarez and El Paso, for example). Capital or exchange controls, in
this context, would be totally ineffective and therefore have never been tried.
The strict deflationary effort in 1977, the first year of Lopez Portillo, produced
the desired effects, as shown in Table 5. In 1978 the inflation rate was halved
from the 32 percent annual rate in 1977, which followed the maxidevaluation
of the previous government late in 1976.
In 1978, the second year of the deflationary program, 5 percent real GDP
growth was expected. In the event, real growth was 7 percent. It is clear that
one of the principal reasons for the higher rate was growing oil investment,
production, and exports, and, more important, the expectations as to an oil-
fueled boom.
As a consequence of this unplanned, high internal demand, overall growth
was far in excess of norms set by the government for the deflationary phase
and the first year of consolidation. The main objective of the whole plan, to
bring down domestic inflation to the external rate by the end of 1979, was
thwarted by appearance of early symptoms of the oil syndrome. The GDP
deflator for 1979 rose by a rate of 18.6 percent, almost 10 percent higher than
the US GDP deflator.
5
The presence of the secondary or policy-induced symptoms of oil can also be
documented in 1978-79. The National Plan for Industrial Development, pub-
lished in 1978, places heavy stress on the use of oil resources to achieve eco-
nomic diversification. One of the main incentives offered in the plan is a 30
percent discount on energy prices to new exporting industries established in
predetermined areas, mainly coastal and border locations. Also, the exchange
rate has been kept stable, in spite of three years of high inflation.
The beginning of the enlargement of the government role and the opening
of the economy (plus the contraction of private consumption) can be observed
in Table 6. It indicates changes in the composition of Mexican GDP in 1978
and 1979. Even during the short two-year period, changes similar to those that
have occurred over the past seven years in the Persian Gulf countries (compare
Table 3 and Table 6), the very same patterns are already detectable in Mexico.
It should be noted, however, that the liberalization of imports, in the form of
substantial elimination of the widespread licensing system (which has been
the hallmark of Mexican protectionism since World War II) started since 1977,
before the oil potential was clearly sized. Oil, however, has helped to reinforce
the wider liberalization effort. The initiation of preliminary negotiations to
join GATT (inconclusive by mid-1980) would probably not have occurred in
Mexico without oil surpluses.
The secondary symptoms are present as well. Monumental congestion in the
ports of Tampico and Pajaritos in the Gulf of Mexico has been visible sinceMEXICAN OIL SYNDROME 123
Table 6
SECONDARY OIL INDICATORS: CHANGES IN GDP COMPOSITION OF










































Source: DIEMEX Data Bank, based on Banco de Mexico Reports.
early 1979. Another case is the railroad clutter in the border town of Nuevo
Laredo, where thousands of freight cars rented from the US are idly waiting
to be moved down to deliver cargo. The construction boom of 1978-79 has
created further transport bottlenecks and shortages (cement and steel are
prominent examples). A real estate boom is under way and land speculation
has intensified, especially in 1979. A steady influx of foreign investment is also
evident.
To recapitulate up to this point, we may observe that developments in the oil
sector during the first half of the Lopez Portillo administration, 1977-79, were
fundamental in keeping the external deficit in check, in accelerating growth
beyond that initially planned, in creating the productive imbalances noted,
and, more important, in frustrating the effort of closing the inflationary gap
by the end of the period. The earlier start of the oil boom, however, had a
salutary effect: it helped Lopez Portillo in his very successful effort to bring
confidence back to the country, which was badly shaken by the devaluation and
other developments in 1976.
PREVENTIVE EFFORTS: THE PRESENT OIL POLICY FOR 1980-82 AND BEYOND
The oil policy of the present administration through 1979 and early 1980
has been cautious. The original (March 1977) plan for the six years was to
reach a production ceiling of 2.25 million barrels per day by 1982, with half
earmarked for exports. The natural gas export goal was 2.2 billion cubic feet
per day at the end of 1982. The disagreement with the US over gas pricing
led to a protracted period of renegotiation, which culminated in the gas agree-
ment of late 1979. This agreement calls for a substantially reduced rate of124 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
exports relative to that initially contemplated: 0.3 to 0.5 billion cubic feet per
day in 1980 at a starting price of $3,625 dollars per thousand cubic feet, sub-
ject to quarterly revisions.
In March 1978 PEMEX announced an upward revision of its policy, based
on additional reserve findings. The production ceiling of 2.25 million bbls/day
was moved from 1982 to 1980. The 1.1 million bbls/day export target was up-
graded accordingly. This was the position prevailing at the beginning of 1980.
It is, however, known that a new upward revision is now under study, based
again on higher reserve estimates, with a 4.0 million bbls/day production
target by 1982. In the event of presidential approval, this new target would be
announced in March of 1981, on the anniversary of the oil nationalization.
As will be shown later, it is not likely that this ambitious goal will be ultimately
approved; rather an intermediate target of perhaps just below 3.0 million bbls/
day seems more probable.
Present oil policy is very conservative. With 33.4 billion barrels of proven
crude oil reserves and a 2.25 bbls/day production target, the ratio of reserves
to annual production is 41 years whereas Saudi Arabia's ratio is around 33
years, Venezuela's ratio is 17 years, and that of the US is 27 years.
This conservatism is based on several factors. One is the traditional na-
tionalism of Mexico, grounded in bad colonial memories of fast exploitation
of nonrenewable, mineral resources for export. The other, more important, is
the awareness of the negative symptoms of fast oil exploitation.
6 Lopez Portillo
has repeatedly expressed the view that immoderate pumping of oil can create
undesirable effects or "financial indigestion" and serious inflation. He is also
on record against the use of oil to make Mexico a net exporter of capital. Other
Mexican officials have also confirmed this mistrust of sudden oil riches, by
linking the Iranian revolution and the 1978 balance of payments problems of
Venezuela to the excesses generated by too rapid exploitation of the oil sector.
As seen in the previous section, these misgivings appear to be well founded.
The early signs of the oil syndrome are already clearly visible in Mexico, in
spite of the deflationary efforts of phase one. This is why 1980 will be a cross-
roads year. With oil and the antiinflationary aim having come to a head in
1979, the administration will have to make the crucial decision between induc-
ing a moderate slowdown or letting the oil boom carry the acceleration of
1978-79 still higher, and risk a further widening of the inflationary gap.
PROGNOSIS: PROSPECTIVE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF OIL IN 1980-82 AND BEYOND
In this final section, I proceed first by describing the economic policy (oil and
nonoil) assumed, and then by presenting the resulting projections or prog-
nosis for the last half of the Lopez Portillo administration, 1980-82, and for
the rest of the decade.MEXICAN OIL SYNDROME 125
CONTINUATION OF THE ANTIINFLATIONARY PLAN, MODERATE DECELERATION IN
1980, HIGHER CRUDE OIL EXPORT PRICES
Hydrocarbons sector
Femex production














Export prices (annual average)
Avg. price of Mex. oil exports ($/bl)
Change (Z)
Avg. price of Mex. gas exports ($/TCF)
Change (Z)
Total value of hydrocarbon exports ($ billions)
Crude oil
Gas
Ratio: hydcrb. exp./exp. gds. svcs. & facs.


























































































































































Based on the current (March 1978) oil plan for the remainder of the present
administration (1980-82) and the assumption of a moderate policy of doubling
the volume of crude oil exports of 1982 by 1989-90, I have forecast the likely
export policy of the next administration, 1983-88. For crude export prices I
incorporate the 62.5 percent increase already effected from December 1978 to
January 1980. From 1981 onwards, I have assumed that Mexican prices will
follow US inflation, with the addition of a declining premium which becomes
zero in 1986. Table 7 contains these estimates, plus those pertaining to natural
gas exports and prices. Both crude and gas export volumes for 1980-82 appear
realistic in light of the 1977-79 experience of PEMEX in reaching its policy
targets. As for the longer run, 1983-88, there is little basis at present for fore-
casting any major deviations from the stated assumptions. A much more ex-
pansive export program may generate external surpluses of higher order, if
growth has to be restrained to avoid excessive inflation, essential if Mexico's
highly open financial system is to remain healthy.
Regarding the other elements of economic policy, I expect in the main
projection (control) that the administration will manage them so as to induce
a moderate deceleration in 1980 in order to avoid compounding its failure to
close the external inflationary gap in 1979. This will, however, be difficult to
accomplish. Two traditional instruments are now unavailable. Austerity gov-
ernment expenditure, used effectively in 1977-78, is difficult to implement
midway through a political term, and almost impossible with the growing oil126 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
resources. Wage restraint, as applied during 1977-79, is also unavailable: mini-
mum wages were adjusted by 21.5 percent on 1 January 1980, almost double
the rate of the three previous years, and they cannot be restrained again. The
burden, then, of the slowdown, if it is decided, will have to fall mostly on
monetary policy and a further opening up of the economy. These are the
main assumptions built into the Control Projection, "Continuation of the
Anti-Inflationary Consolidation Plan," whose main results are shown in Tables
8 and 9.
Other policy assumptions are the following. To protect nonoil exports (and
the diversification effort) against the accumulated effects of the inflationary
gap, a "midi" adjustment to the peso is anticipated in 1981. See Table 8. Real
public expenditure maintains its recent pace, as shown in Table 8. Wage policy
CONTINUATION OF THE ANTINSXATIONARY PLAN, MODERATE DECELERATIONS
IN 1980, HIGHER CRUDE OIL EXPORT PRICES
Main economic Indicators
Gross domestic product (billion pesos 1960)
Change (Z)
Gross domestic product (billion pesos)
Change (%)
Sectoral output
Primary sector (billion pesos 1960)
Change (Z)
Secondary sector (billion pesos 1960)
Change (%)
Tertiary sector (billion pesos 1960)
Change (%)
Prices and wages
Implicit price deflator - GDP (1960-1.0)
Change (%)
Consumers' price index - National (1960-1.0)
Change (%)
Wholesale price index (1960-1.0)
Change (%)
Average annual wage rate (thousands pesoB)
Change (X)
Average annual wage rate (thousand pesos 1960)
Change (Z)
Exchange rate (pesos per dollar)
Average for the year
Change (Z)
Value at the end of the year
Change (Z)
Balance on current account (billion dollars)
Exports ($ billion)
Imports ($ billion)
Long-term capital account ($ billion)
Long-term capital inflows
Public sector
Private sector and others
Total long-term public external debt ($ billion)
Public external debt/GDP ratio
Money supply - Ml (billion pesos)
Change (Z)
Govt. total expenditures (billion pesos 1960)
Change (%)
Total gross fixed investment (billion pesos 1960)
Change (Z)
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Table 9
PROJECTION OF THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OIL INDICATORS OF
MEXICO 1985 and 1990 (percentages)
Primary indicators
Share of crude oil
in merchandise exports































































Source: DIEMEX-Wharton Control Projection, 1980-90, of
31 January 1980.
remains liberal, while monetary policy remains tight, as can be appreciated by
comparing the rates of growth of Ml with nominal GDP (Table 8).
In spite of the restrained character of this oil and economic policy package,
the oil symptoms become more pronounced from 1980 onward, according to
the estimates of Table 8. Let us consider first the primary symptoms.
(1) The most distinctive sign of the oil syndrome, a surplus in the external
accounts, appears from 1982 onward. It is of minor order, however, and it dis-
sipates by the middle of the decade. From there on a quasi-equilibrium is
maintained (Table 8).
In line with this development, foreign borrowing contracts only in relative,
not in absolute, terms. Long-term public debt, as a ratio of GDP, falls from
23 percent in 1979 to 11 percent by 1984, and to 5 percent by 1990. Under
present plans, Mexico, then, will not soon become an international investor or
lender.
The projection of the primary oil indicators, at the top of Table 9, shows
Mexico matching the "scores" of some of the Persian Gulf economies. By the
mid-1980s, oil will account for 75 percent of its merchandise exports. Crude128 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
oil output per capita will reach 16 barrels per inhabitant. Mexican output
diversification, however, will keep hydrocarbons at less than 9 percent of
GDP. By 1990 they will increase somewhat, especially crude output per capita.
(2) After the mild deceleration of 1980, growth rates above 8 percent,
which are abnormally high for Mexico, appear in 1981-82. During the next
presidential six years, 1983-88, with the exception of the traditionally slow first
year of the political cycle, 7—7.5 percent growth rates could be maintained
(Table 9).
Accordingly, labor demand will keep advancing in the 3.7-3.9 percent range,
which will help to attain almost equilibrium in the labor market, as labor
supply is estimated to grow yearly at a high 4.0-4.3 percent, due to the influx
of women to the labor force (Table 9).
If sectoral growth well below the overall GDP growth is taken as a sign of
a bottleneck, agriculture will remain the most serious one (Table 8). The
same will happen, although to a lesser extent, with transport and communica-
tions, which will grow below GDP (not shown in the table).
(3) The most serious symptom is inflation. In 1980 it will accelerate. In
spite of the antiinflationary effort noted before, it may reach 22 percent, mea-
sured by the GDP deflator (Table 8). From there only a very gradual decelera-
tion can be expected by the end of the Lopez Portillo administration. In the
longer run, projected inflation does not fall below 15 percent. This chronic
inflationary gap portends major economic consequences. It may mean the un-
avoidability of indexation of the important prices: wages, interest rates, and
even the rate of exchange, if the fundamental objective of protecting the non-
oil exports is to prevail, without burdensome subsidization. A stronger dose of
a stop-and-go policy, as applied in Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, could be
another possibility that may happen in 1981-82, precisely during the years
earmarked for expansion.
The policy-induced or secondary oil symptoms — industrial diversification
through rapid capital formation, expansion of the government role and the
opening of the economy — become more increasingly evident in the prognosis
for later years, as Table 9 shows. The estimate for gross fixed investment reaches
almost 30 percent of GDP by 1985, while imports of goods and services grow
to 18 percent. Government expenditure rises to 25 percent. Private consump-
tion contracts to 64 percent. By 1990 these changes become more pronounced.
A comparison of these compositional changes with those of Iran, Saudi
Arabia, and Venezuela, in Table 3, helps to show that they are similar in nature
and speed. The differences, however, are also important. Mexico does not
reach, even in the prognosis for 1990, the extremely high levels of export and
import shares of the three OPEC members, nor does its private consumption
share fall as low. Mexico's demographic size, advanced industrialization, and
large internal market are the "differentia."MEXICAN OIL SYNDROME 129
One caveat merits mention: if, due to oil, the effort to continue the anti-
inflationary consolidation falters, the deceleration of 1980 may not materialize.
In this case, the economy may grow faster and inflation may accelerate even
further than projected. The oil syndrome then will become even more marked.
In conclusion, the impact of oil will generate in Mexico the standard symp-
toms (although in a milder form) observable in other oil-rich countries: high
growth, inflation, and even a surplus in the external accounts. Mexico will not
be essentially different, according to my prognosis. The difference will be that
the long border with the US will force policy to make a strong stand to contain
inflation. This may mean that the oil program cannot become more dynamic
than it is now.
CONCLUSION
The answers given by this article to the four original questions can be
summarized as follows:
With the rapid development of its oil sector, during the recent past, 1978—
79, Mexico has shown clear evidence of the early signs of the oil syndrome, as
found in the Persian Gulf countries, although in a milder form, given Mexico's
size and economic diversification.
Unplanned rapid growth weakened Lopez Portillo's antiinflationary effort.
As a result, his fundamental aim of eliminating the external inflationary gap
(mainly with the US), before entering the oil-based expansionary phase, did not
materialize.
The long (and hard to control) northern border, makes Mexico a very
open economy. Consequently, a chronic inflationary gap cannot be allowed,
if a weakening of the financial system and a strengthening of the income pro-
tection demands are to be avoided.
The prognosis for 1980 and beyond is for a continuation of a tug-of-war
between Lopez Portillo's antiinflationary stand and the oil boom. In the main
projection, I expect an effort to decelerate growth this year. Inflation, however,
will accelerate and yield only slightly in 1981-82.
Barring an application of a severe dose of a stop-and-go policy, growth will
accelerate in 1981—82 above 8 percent, with favorable consequences for the goal
of equilibrating the labor market.
In the prognosis, a prudent oil policy is assumed. It reaches 2.8 million bbls/
day of crude output by 1982 and doubles by 1990.
NOTES
1. Vahan Zanoyan, of Wharton EFA, in his recent study has provided the notion
of the oil countries in the intermediate position in the spectrum between the LDC
and the MDC. See [3, pp. 2-5], a study prepared for the Gulf Organization for In-
dustrial Consulting.130 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
2. Zanoyan rejects the hypothesis that there is a backward bending oil supply curve
in the Persian Gulf nations. Saudi Arabian curtailment of output in 1977 was not a
response to higher real prices (they declined), but to lower international demand.
See [3, pp. 8-9].
3. It should be noted that these policies are not, in principle, exclusive of the oil-
exporting countries; they are universal of most developing nations. What is peculiar
is their cause, and especially the speed, extent, and methods with which they can
be implemented by the oil countries. Regarding methods, not all LDCs have to fight
inflation by the foreign lending or revaluation.
4. By successfully following this policy of keeping an almost zero inflationary gap
with the US, its main trading partner, Mexico was able to maintain a stable peso
vis-a-vis the dollar for 22 years. The robust expansion of its financial system during
the decade of the 1960s was, in turn, founded on the certainty of a stable exchange
rate.
5. Some Mexican economists have stated lightly that even with the best inflationary
intentions of its neighbor, Mexico could not reach its own.
6. An excellent statement of the Mexican misgivings of sudden oil wealth is pro-
vided in the editorial article "El Reto del Petroleo" in [1].
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